Does colonisation explain differences in trade performance across developing countries? In this paper, we analyse the differential impact of British versus French colonial legacies on the current trade of African ex-colonies. We initially find that former British colonies trade more, on average, than do their French counterparts. This difference might be the result of the relative superiority of British institutions. However, a core concern is the non-random selection of colonies by the British. Historians argue that with Britain, trade preceded colonisation. Using an instrument based on colonisation history to control for this endogeneity, we find no evidence of a systematic difference between the British and French colonial legacies with respect to trade. This finding suggests that the apparent better performance of British ex-colonies might be instead explained by pre-colonial conditions. JEL classification: F10, F54, O55 † We would like to thank three referees for thorough and very useful comments. We are
Introduction
Africa accounts for a tiny share of world trade (3.2% of world exports in 2009 according to the WTO). This share is considered 'normal' with regard to Africa's income level and geography (see Foroutan and Pritchett, 1993; Rodrik, 1998; Coe and Hoffmaister, 1999) . Geography strongly affects African trade, notably through landlockness (Coulibaly and Fontagné, 2006) and ruggedness (Nunn and Puga, 2009) . However, bad geography may be 'trumped' by the quality of institutions (Rodrik et al., 2004) . Thus, institutions could be modified and improved in ways that would increase trade. For instance, the improvement of the quality of contract enforcement or the reduction of border delays may be expected to result in significantly improved trade performance in Africa (see, e.g., Freund and Rocha, 2010) . This is crucial for African economic development since international trade is a driver of productivity change and a vehicle of technology in the interest of catching up with high-income economies (Grossman and Helpman, 1991) . Other channels through which international trade can affect economic development are notably specialisation according to comparative advantage, exploitation of increasing returns from larger markets and exchange of ideas through communication and travel (Frankel and Romer, 1999) .
In this paper, we focus on institutions inherited from the colonial period and their potential effects on the current trade situation of former colonies. This topic connects two strands of the literature. The first one investigates the effect of the colonial legacy on economic growth and development (see Nunn, 2009 , for a review). In particular, several studies have shown former British colonies to perform better on average than their French counterparts in terms of economic growth (e.g., Grier, 1999; Bertocchi and Canova, 2002) . Acemoglu et al. (2001) highlight the importance of the initial conditions in the colonies and the subsequent strategy of colonisation (extraction versus settlement) independent of the identity of the colonising power. They argue that settlement colonies, with their low mortality rates of European settlers, had institutions that enforced the rule of law and encouraged investment. These institutions persisted to the present and determine current economic development. Price (2003) confirms, in the African context, the importance of the initial conditions: a worsening of the malaria disease environment resulted in extractive growth-retarding institutions that persisted after independence.
The second strand of the literature investigates the effect of the colonial legacy on international trade, with a unique focus on the impact of common colonial ties. Empirical evidence suggests that colonial ties between the colony and its coloniser or between countries colonised by the same coloniser have strongly affected past colonial trade (Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2008) and current trade (e.g., Rose, 2000) , even if their impact partly eroded after independence (Head et al., 2010) . Beyond the impact of common colonial ties, the trade literature does not explore whether a country's prior colonial status matters per se.
Africa is a particularly interesting continent in which to examine this issue for two reasons. First, Africa is a more homogeneous area with respect to the pre-and post-colonial context than are all former colonies taken together.
1 Second, for the half-century following World War I, France and Britain, the two major colonial European powers, controlled approximately four-fifths of the African continent. We exploit this historical feature to investigate the differential effect of British versus French institutions inherited from the colonial period on current African trade. This investigation contributes to the recent empirical literature on the role of institutions in international trade.
A wealth of social science literature documents the existence of systematic institutional differences between the British and French colonial systems. 2 We exploit two potential sources of observable institutional differences in colonial legacies: (1) legal origin and (2) trade policy.
3 While the latter difference has a direct effect on trade, the first one has a more indirect effect. We first expose the institutional differences, before explaining how they may affect trade. Legal rules differ among legal origins, which were typically introduced through conquest and colonisation. British common 1 In Central and South America, the process of colonisation dates back to the sixteenth century, and Asian colonisation is more heterogeneous due to the early experience of India and the specificities of Japanese colonisation of Taiwan and Korea (see Bertocchi and Canova, 2002) . 2 There is a debate among historians of the 'contrast' school, who argue that colonial powers had different colonial philosophies (e.g., Crowder, 1968) , and those of the 'similarity' school, who point out a tendency of the contrast school to exaggerate differences rather than similarities between colonial policies (e.g., Kiwanuka, 1970; Fieldhouse, 1982; Firmin-Sellers, 2000) . 3 The rule of administration constitutes a third observable difference. The British more often opted for the so-called indirect rule working through indigenous rulers and preserving traditional institutions. In contrast, the French adopted a more direct rule of administration, abolishing indigenous institutions and imposing colonial officers in a Jacobin tradition of omnipresence of the republican state (e.g., Crowder, 1968) . The differences in colonial rule may have long-term effects on institutional quality and governance (Lange, 2004; Nunn, 2007) . However, their impact on trade is more difficult to grasp. Porta et al., 1997 Porta et al., , 1998 . British common law countries are also characterised by a lower level of corruption (Treisman, 2000) , better government efficiency, more secure property rights and better (less intrusive) regulation than French civil law countries (La Porta et al., 1999 , for a review).
Trade policy is a second observable difference between the British and French colonial systems. The attitude of Britain towards international trade was quite different from that of the other European powers, among them France. Between 1875 and 1913, Britain had a free trade policy, where tariffs on manufactured imports were-uniquely-zero (Findlay and O'Rourke, 2007, pp. 402 -3) . In contrast, in France, industrial tariffs approached 20%. Their colonial trade policy was also contrasted. The French Empire enforced mercantilist and protectionist measures in colonial trade (see Fieldhouse, 1982; Bairoch, 1989) . Tariff policies in French colonies discriminated more in favour of French products. 'As would be expected, the most liberal policies were those imposed by the British, whose colonies typically adopted low tariffs that were typically nondiscriminatory' (Findlay and O'Rourke, 2007, p. 401) . Indeed, trade of British colonies was open to all foreign countries until 1932. In 1932, following the Ottawa conference, the UK took a decisive move towards protection by establishing limited tariffs within the British Empire and higher tariffs with the rest of the world (Findlay and O'Rourke, 2007, p. 451) . The British colonies were also expected to introduce imperial preference on a wide range of imports. However, most African British colonies (including Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Kenya, Uganda, among others) could not introduce such an imperial preference. They were committed by international agreements preserving free trade and signed by Britain at the time of the partition of Africa (Havinden and Meredith, 1993, p. 188; Cain and Hopkins, 2001, p. 585) .
Given that these two institutional differences persisted to the present (Nunn, 2007) , they can be a source of comparative advantage. First, differences in legal origin may impact trade. Cross-country differences in the quality of institutions are indeed recognised to influence international trade, especially in contract enforcement, protection of property rights and corruption (e.g. Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; Levchenko, 2007) . Second, differences in trade policy inherited from the colonial period may matter since lower levels of trade restrictions can be expected to result in significantly improved trade performance in Africa (Rodrik, 1998) .
To investigate the differential effect of British and French institutional legacies on current African trade, we use a theoretical gravity model and a large sample of countries. We initially find that former British colonies in Africa trade more, on average, than do their French counterparts. This 'British effect' is robust to multilateral resistances and specific observable differences between the British and French empires. However, despite the introduction of control variables, this effect does not necessarily have a causal interpretation. The 'British effect' might be related to specific precolonial trade patterns. Territories colonised by the British may tend to trade intrinsically more.
A core concern is in fact the non-random selection of colonies by the British. Historians argue that British colonisation seems related to precolonial trade (e.g., Crowder, 1968; Fage, 2002) . Indeed, looking closely into the history of African colonisation, we find evidence that 'with Britain trade preceded the flag, or directed where the flag should be flown' (Crowder, 1968, p. 70) . Selection, based on pre-colonial trade, may produce an overestimation of the 'British effect' . To overcome this positive selection bias, we use an instrumental variable (IV) approach. The reliability of this approach lies on the identification of an appropriate instrument for the British colonisation.
To instrument the probability of being colonised by the British, we exploit a striking feature of colonisation in Africa: the 'race' between European powers. In less than 30 years starting from the mid-1870s, most of Africa was colonised and divided up between the British and the French (Pakenham, 1992) . This 'Scramble for Africa' was encouraged by European rivalries (e.g., Gallagher and Robinson, 1953; CoqueryVidrovitch, 1970; Griffiths, 1993) . Based on this historical feature, we construct a simple instrument: the area (in square kilometres) colonised by the French Empire in Africa at the time of colonisation of a given territory. We argue that this is a good instrument because it satisfies two conditions: (1) it is relevant, i.e., it explains the British colonisation and (2) it is exogenous, i.e., it is not correlated with the current trade of former British colonies.
We found compelling historical evidence supporting the validity of our instrument. Before the Scramble, the objectives of the two main colonial powers in Africa were different. Britain was attracted by the economic opportunities in Africa and by foreign trade in particular. But Britain was not attracted by colonisation per se and first exerted her influence without any formal annexation of large territories. In contrast, 'the French interest cannot be so surely demonstrated in economic terms' (Fage, 2002) . French conquest was seen as a means to compensate for the humiliating defeat against the Germans in 1871 and was supposed to offer great opportunities for promotion and honours of the military. However, French expansion threatened British trade and led finally Britain to support formal annexation of territories where they had trade interests. Figure 1 supports this evidence and the relevance of our instrument (condition 1). It plots the logarithm of the area colonised by the French against the number of territories annexed by the British at the same date. It shows a strong positive relationship illustrating the Scramble. We think of our IV strategy as initiating a causal chain where the instrument, the foreign expansion, affects the variable of interest, the British colonisation, which in turn affects current trade. Moreover, as noted above, France's interest in Africa was mainly related to political pressures (Fieldhouse, 1982) . So, it is reasonable to consider that the French expansion is unrelated to the current trade of former British colonies, which satisfies an exclusion restriction (condition 2).
The first stage of our IV approach confirms that an increase in the size of the French Empire increases the probability of a British colonisation. In the second stage, the initial 'British effect' vanishes. Indeed, controlling for the endogeneity in the relationship between colonisation and trade, we find no evidence of a systematic differential effect of British versus French colonisation on former colonies' current trade. We interpret this result in the light of the role played by the pre-colonial conditions. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the empirical model. In Section 3, we describe the data and discuss some estimation issues. In Section 4, we report the basic estimates of the 'British effect' on international trade of former colonies. In Section 5, we address the endogeneity between colonisation and trade. Finally, in Section 6, we summarise and discuss our findings.
Empirical model
To investigate the effect of the colonial status of the former British and French colonies on current trade, we use a theoretical gravity model (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003) . This model relates the bilateral exports (X ij ) of country i to country j to the size of their respective economies (Y i and Y j ), their implicit price indices (P i and P j ) and bilateral trade costs (t ij ) as follows:
where Y w is the nominal world income, s . 1 the elasticity of substitution between all goods, and
where u j is country j's share of world income, and
Price indices (P i ) and (P j ), termed 'multilateral resistance' indices in the literature, account for the fact that 'the more resistant to trade with all others a region is, the more it is pushed to trade with a given bilateral partner' (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003) . We assume trade costs (t ij ) to be a loglinear function:
where z ij is a vector of observable arguments that affect bilateral trade:
where Distance ij is the average great circle distance between capital cities of countries i and j, Language ij is a dummy variable indicating that i and j share a language and RTA ij is a dummy variable indicating that i and j share a regional free trade agreement. Following the trade literature, we also capture the impact of common colonial ties on trade (e.g., Rose, 2000; Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2008; Head et al., 2010) . We therefore introduce a dummy Comcol ij indicating that i and j have been colonised by the same coloniser, a dummy ColonywithUK ij for bilateral relationships between a former British colony and Great Britain and a dummy ColonywithFRA ij for bilateral relationships between a former French colony and France. Beyond the impact of common colonial ties, we aim to explore whether a country's prior colonial status matters per se. In other words, does a former British colony trade, on average, more than a former French colony? Differences in colonial legacies may result in differences in trade costs affecting the volume of trade. As noted above, British common law countries appear to have less corruption, better contract enforcement and better protection of property rights. This overall higher institutional quality may reduce trade costs (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; Levchenko, 2007) . Moreover, the British Empire favoured free trade policies, whereas the French Empire generally enforced protectionist measures. This may also translate into differences in trade costs. Hence, to capture the differential impact of British and French legacies on trade cost, we introduce in equation (4) a British_col i/j dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the exporter (i) or the importer (j) is a former British colony and 0 if it is a former French colony (see below). Accordingly, we expect g uk to be positive. Applying a log transformation to equation (1), replacing the trade cost factor with the set of observable elements in equation (4), introducing time subscripts and adding the traditional error term 1 ijt , which captures all other determinants of bilateral trade, yields:
The coefficient of interest to us is a, which measures the differential impact of British versus French colonial legacies on the current trade of former African colonies. The estimation of a raises some issues about:
(1) the sample designed for the interpretation of the differential effect of the colonial status; (2) the estimation of the multilateral resistances that depend on trade barriers between each country and all of its trading partners (not just the bilateral partner); and (3) the endogenous selection of the British colonies. In the next section, we present the data and address the first two estimation issues. Then, after presenting a benchmark estimation of a, we will devote a section to the endogeneity issue.
Data and estimation issues

Data
Our sample includes fifty-nine countries, of which thirty-four are African countries, all of which are former French or British colonies, and twenty-five non-African countries (twenty-two OECD countries and three large emerging countries-Brazil, Russia and China). The list of countries is detailed in Table A1 . Trade data come from the DOTS database provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Other variables such as GDP were obtained from various sources (see Table A2 ). The time period of our sample is 2000-09. 
Estimation issues
The first issue concerns the design of the sample. The overall sample comprises all bilateral trade relationships between our fifty-nine African and nonAfrican countries, i.e., potentially 34,220 observations (59 × 58 countries × 10 years). This overall sample allows for general results, but complicates the interpretation of our variable of interest, the British_col i/j dummy. In fact, in this sample, trade performances of former British colonies are not strictly compared with those of former French colonies. To compare them directly, we introduce into the regression a dummy variable (called NONAFRICA ij ) identifying trade between non-African countries, i.e., OECD or emerging countries. In this way, former French colonies become the base group against which all comparisons are made. We also adopt a different strategy to identify the British colonisation effect. We use a reduced sample, focusing on bilateral trade between African countries and non-African countries. This amounts to a removal from the overall sample of the trade relationships (1) between non-African countries, and (2) between African countries. This reduced sample comprises potentially 17,000 observations (34 African countries × 25 OECD or emerging countries × 10 years × 2). In this case, if the exporter i is an OECD or an emerging country, the importer j is always a former British colony or a former French colony. Conversely, if the exporter i is a former British or French colony, the importer j is always an OECD or an emerging country. In this reduced sample, the definition of the British_col i/j dummy implies that the former French colonies are the base group against which comparisons are made.
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A second major issue is the control of time-dependent and countryspecific multilateral resistance indices, (P it ) and (P jt ). We use four different specifications to address this issue. The first is a fairly simple and efficient approach. We use an OLS estimator with a vector of exporter and importer country dummies and estimate equation (6) year by year (see Baldwin, 2004) . In the second specification, we use again an OLS estimator with a vector of country-year dummies (i.e., country dummies interacted with year dummies) and estimate equation (6) on the panel sample (2000 -09) (see Feenstra and Taglioni, 2006) . 6 These two specifications are appropriate only for the overall sample, however. In the reduced sample, our variable of interest (British_col i/j ) would be absorbed by the country or the countryyear dummy variables. A third solution to capture multilateral resistance indices in our (overall or reduced) panel data set consists of using the within estimator. This solution entails the introduction of country-pair dummies (called dyad fixed effects) instead of country dummies. In this way, we control for any time-invariant factor affecting bilateral trade, i.e., country-and dyad-specific effects. Using this third specification, we implicitly assume the multilateral resistance terms to be partly absorbed by the dyad fixed effects and to change little over time. This assumption seems reasonable, as we consider a relatively short time period from 2000 to 2009.
7 A caveat of the within estimator is its inability to estimate the coefficient of our variable of interest, i.e., the British_col i/j dummy, which is time-invariant. To solve this problem, we adopt a fourth specification using the Mundlak (1978) approach. The Mundlak approach reconciles the random effect estimator and the within estimator.
8 It posits that the dyad fixed effects can be projected upon the group means of the time-varying variables. As a consequence, addition of the mean of the time-varying variables to the equation picks up the correlation between the dyad fixed effects and the explanatory variables. In this case, a random effect estimator should yield unbiased estimates (see Wooldridge, 2002) . In panel specifications 3 and 4, we also add a vector of time dummies to control for the general evolution of trade.
Baseline estimates: the 'British effect'
Our baseline results are reported in Table 1 . We use the overall sample in the first four columns and the reduced sample in the last two columns (see above).
In column (1), we estimate equation (6) on the overall sample for a single year (2009). 9 In this cross-sectional model, we introduce a vector However, we elected not to use the PQML estimator because we have relatively few zero trade observations (about 10% of all observations, depending on the sample). 7 This is another reason for choosing the current period from 2000 to 2009 instead of a longer time span (see above). 8 Recall that the random effect estimator is inconsistent when some of the explanatory variables are correlated with the unobserved dyad fixed effects, while the within estimates are always unbiased. 9 Note that the results are not sensitive to the choice of a particular year. Year-by-year regressions are available upon request. Fieldhouse, 1982; Bairoch, 1989; Findlay and O'Rourke, 2007, chap. 7, pp. 401 -2) . Thus, French colonies were forced to import from France, to sell their goods to France and to use French ships. These results mirror other estimates in the literature. Without distinguishing between the two Empires, Rose (2000) has already shown that ex-colonies and their coloniser as well as countries with the same coloniser have disproportionately intense trade. The root cause of this intense trade comes from the colonial period. Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008) confirm that, during the Age of High Imperialism, 1870-1913, belonging to an empire roughly doubled trade relative to those countries that were not part of an empire. However, Head et al. (2010) find a gradual deterioration of trade between former colonies of the same empire as well as trade with the metropole. This 'suggests the depreciation of some form of trading capital' (op. cit., p. 1).
Recall that our overall sample comprises all bilateral trade relationships between our fifty-nine African and non-African countries. Accordingly, to compare the trade performance of former British colonies with that of former French colonies, we add into the regression a dummy variable (NONAFRICA ij ) identifying trade between non-African countries. Former French colonies thus become the base group against which all comparisons are made. Thus, we find that, on average, countries that were colonised by the British trade as much as three times [¼exp(1.10)] more with OECD, emerging and African countries than do those that were colonised by the French, all other things being equal. Surprisingly, we find a non-significant estimate for the non-African bilateral dummy (NONAFRICA ij ). This could be because our first specification with country dummies does not account properly for the bilateral factors affecting bilateral trade (see below).
In column (2), we estimate equation (6) on the overall sample for the whole time period 2000 -09. We use our second specification and introduce country-year fixed effects to account for time-varying multilateral resistance terms, as suggested by Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) . The British_col i/j coefficient is still highly significant and differs little from its estimate in column (1).
In column (3), we use the same sample and time period as in column (2). However, we now use the within estimator (specification 3) to control for any bilateral time-independent factor affecting bilateral trade. This benchmark estimation is then compared with the estimates of column (4). In this latter column, we use the Mundlak (1978) approach (specification 4), i.e., we add to the estimated equation the means of all time-varying regressors (the GDP variables and the RTA dummy) and use a random effect estimator. As expected, the coefficients on the timevarying variables are very similar in columns (3) and (4). The estimate of the British_col i/j dummy is of smaller magnitude than in the first two columns, yet still highly significant. This finding indicates that, on average, a former British colony trades 25% [¼exp(0.22) 2 1] more with OECD, emerging and African countries than does a former French colony. The Mundlak specification is our preferred specification. It controls more properly for country-pair (unobserved) factors affecting bilateral trade. As a consequence, it avoids overestimation of the coefficient of the British_col i/j variable. Moreover, the NONAFRICA ij estimate appears now to be positive and significant.
In the last two columns, we use the Mundlak specification on the reduced sample, focusing on the trade of African countries (i.e., former French and British colonies) with OECD and emerging countries. This sample eases the interpretation of the British_col i/j dummy (see Section 3). Estimation results reported in column (5) are broadly similar to those in column (4), which corresponds to the overall sample. There are a few exceptions, however. The magnitude of the 'British effect' is slightly larger due to the removal of trade between African countries from the sample. Without speculating too much about the differences in magnitude, this result suggests that the relative advantage of former British colonies is larger for trade with OECD and emerging countries than it is for trade with African countries.
A concern is that our results may be driven, at least in part, by omitted systematic differences between the former British and French colonies. These differences may impact their current trade and explain the 'British effect'. We address this concern in column (6). We introduce into the regression five country characteristics to further differentiate the two groups.
10 First, the use of English as the world's dominant language could offer the former British colonies an advantage in promoting international trade. Thus, we introduce a variable measuring the fraction of the population speaking English, using data from Hall and Jones (1999) . Second, geography influences trade costs in Africa (see Coulibaly and Fontagné, 2006) and may be a source of potential differences between both groups. Thus, we add a dummy variable identifying landlocked countries. Third, we control for the different natural resources endowments of former British and French colonies. The former British Empire includes major gold producers, such as South Africa or Zimbabwe, while several ex-French colonies such as Gabon or Congo are specialised in oil production. Consequently, we introduce into the estimated equation two variables measuring the annual average per capita production of gold and oil between 1970 and 2000 (in log terms). Fourth, we add an index of infrastructure quality constructed by Limao and Venables (2001) from road, rail and telecommunication density. Infrastructure affects trade costs, and the apparent higher infrastructure quality of British ex-colonies could explain their better trade performance (see Table A3 ). Finally, we add an indicator measuring the current institutional quality in former colonies. We use the index of rule of law developed by Kaufmann et al. (2010) , which aims to capture the quality of contract enforcement, security of property rights and predictability of the judiciary (see also Levchenko, 2007) . Using this rough measure, we observe that the institutional quality to be higher in the former British colonies than in the French ones (see Table A3 ).
The estimation results for these additional control variables are largely as expected. As in Melitz (2008) , we find that the use of English has no specific impact on trade.
11 Moreover, landlocked countries are found to trade less than coastal countries. Gold production slightly increases trade, while oil production appears to have a negative and less significant effect on 10 See Table A3 for raw differences between the former British and French colonies and Table A2 for definition and sources of the variables. 11 Melitz (2008) Other estimates are only slightly affected. In particular, the estimate of the British_col i/j variable remains positive and highly significant. Thus, none of these additional current country characteristics appears to explain why former British colonies perform significantly better in terms of trade than do their French counterparts. In summary, despite differences in magnitude, the cross-section and panel estimates reveal a positive and significant differential effect of British versus French colonial legacies on current international trade of former colonies.
Endogeneity issues: history matters!
Previous results indicate that former British colonies trade more, on average, than their French counterparts. However, the estimation of equation (6) might be affected by an endogeneity bias in the relationship between colonisation and trade. A positive correlation between British colonisation and trade may simply reflect the role of pre-colonial trade patterns. Our British dummy may indeed capture both a colonisation as well as a pre-colonisation effect. In the first subsection, we present historical evidence for the importance of pre-colonial trade for the British and their strategy of colonisation. In a second subsection, we present our IV strategy and the estimates.
Historical evidence
Based on her sea-power, Britain was quite influential in Africa starting from the eighteenth century. Compelling historical evidence suggests that Britain was attracted, prior to the Berlin Conference (1884 -85), by the economic opportunities in Africa, and by foreign trade in particular. On the export side, Britain was looking for outlets for her manufactured goods. This was the time of the Industrial Revolution. Thus, 'a sizeable proportion of British shipping, trading and manufacturing capital had become dependent on selling goods to Africa, and to West Africa in particular' (Fage, 2002, p. 334) . On the import side, Britain sought to secure supplies of raw materials. 13 However, at that time, Britain exerted her influence without any formal annexation of large territories (see Crowder, 1968; Wesseling, 2002) . Colonisation was considered too costly and the British Treasury, which had a considerable influence, was putting pressure against formal colonisation (Crowder, 1968) . Thus, the British had limited their colonial commitments to small enclaves on the coast from which they could secure their trading interests. At that time, vast areas were under the rule of chartered company such as the Royal Niger Company founded by Sir George Taubman Goldie in the lower and middle Niger or the British South Africa Company founded by Cecil Rhodes in Rhodesia (Zambia and Zimbabwe). The role of these companies was to extend the boundaries of the empire. 'In the promoters' eyes chartered enterprise was, above all, a form of public service. These companies could take risks that government was unwilling to shoulder. Without costing the taxpayer anything and before imperialism had become a popular cause, the chartered company could reserve large areas of Africa for British influence and trade' (Gann and Duignan, 1978, p. 38) .
Thus, before the Berlin Conference and the 'Scramble for Africa', the British developed commercial interests in Africa and helped their traders in their business without engaging in colonisation. In contrast, 'the French interest cannot be so surely demonstrated in economic terms ' (Fage, 2002) . France, lagging behind, did not have the same pressing needs for African products and markets. Its economy was far less dependent on foreign trade than was Britain's (Fage, 2002 ). France's interest in Africa was more related to political pressures (Fieldhouse, 1982) . Conquest was seen as a means to compensate for the humiliating defeat against the Germans in 1871 and was supposed to offer great opportunities for promotion and honours of the military.
The French strategy of conquest exacerbated European rivalry. This rivalry is a crucial factor that explains the British change of attitude towards colonisation and the 'Scramble for Africa' (see Gallagher and Robinson, 1953; Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1970; Griffiths, 1993) . The threat of foreign expansion led Britain to accept formal annexation and to engage in the scramble. 'After 1888, Salisbury, Rosebery and Chamberlain accepted the Scramble for Africa as a painful but unavoidable necessity which arose from a threat of foreign expansion and the irrepressible tendency of trade to overflow the bounds of empire' (Gallagher and Robinson, 1953, p. 12) . Thus, in a very short period of time, most of Africa was colonised and divided up among European powers (Pakenham, 1992) .
The example of West Africa is particularly striking in illustrating differences between the British and French colonisation strategies (see Crowder, 1968; Fage, 2002) . For France, land quantity appeared more important than their quality. In contrast, 'the areas Britain claimed were those in which her traders had been active, or saw future profit. Thus where with France, the flag tended to precede trade, with Britain trade preceded the flag, or directed where the flag should be flown, with the result that Britain gained the smaller but richer part of West Africa' (Crowder, 1968, p. 70) . This historical evidence leads to the hypothesis that the British selected their colonies based on their pre-colonial trading patterns.
IV estimates
Formally, the above historical evidence amounts to a correlation between the error term and the British colonisation variable. To overcome this endogeneity bias, an indicator reflecting pre-colonial trade could be introduced to the estimated equation. However, data on pre-colonial trade are not readily accessible. As a result, we pursue a different strategy. To account for this typical endogeneity problem, we use an IV estimator. The first step amounts to estimating an equation that explains the British_col dummy as a function of some observable factors, including an instrument (i.e., an exclusion variable).
We exploit a striking feature of colonisation in Africa to find an instrument for British colonisation: the 'race' between European powers. As pointed out above, the French expansion led Britain to approve and support formal annexation. In West Africa, for instance, the French advance on the lower Niger at the beginning of the 1880s urged Britain to formally annex Nigeria (Pakenham, 1992) . 'In 1896, Britain made the annexation [of the Ashanti territory, in Ghana] official, being alarmed by the inland advance of the Germans in Togo to the east and that of the French in the Ivory Coast to the west' (Curtin et al., 1995) . Hence, one natural instrument for British colonisation is a measure of the area colonised by the French empire in Africa before the formal colonisation 14 Figure 1 reveals a strong positive relationship between the area annexed by France in Africa and the number of territories annexed by the British at the same date. We, therefore, think of our IV strategy as initiating a causal chain where the instrument, that is the foreign expansion, affects the variable of interest, that is the British colonisation, which in turn affects current trade. Furthermore, we argue that our instrument is exogenous, that is, not correlated with the current trade of former British colonies. As noted above, the French colonisation strategy in Africa is essentially related to political pressures (Fieldhouse, 1982) . So, it is reasonable to consider that the French expansion is unrelated to the current trade of former British colonies, which satisfies an exclusion restriction.
Construction of the instrument is as follows. First, for each former British and French colony, we determine the year of first annexation as reported in the Correlates of War (COW) database. 15 In most cases, the year of the first annexation corresponds to what is currently recognised as the date of colonisation (see Table A1 ). Then, we measure the total area (in square kilometres) annexed by the other major coloniser (France for a British colony or Britain for a French one) in Africa before the year of first annexation of a given colony. 16 Thus, for each former colony, we obtain a quantitative measure of the extension of the other empire before colonisation. This variable should proxy the extent of foreign expansion that contributes to explain formal colonisation. We specify this excluded instrument in a logarithmic form.
The results of the IV estimates are reported in Table 2 . The bottom rows of column (1) correspond to the first stage estimation and show that our instrument, the log of the size of the other empire, has a highly significant effect on the probability of British colonisation. Furthermore, as expected, the estimate is positive. This suggests that, other things being equal, the British tended to increase their empire with the French colonial expansion. This result supports the simple correlation shown in Figure 1 . The other first-stage estimates are reported in Table A4 .
Results of the second stage using the Mundlak specification on the reduced panel (as in column (5) of Table 1 ) are reported at the top of 14 To control for the endogeneity between colonisation and past common colonial trade, Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008) also use an IV approach. Their instrument for empire is the 5-year lagged value of the world size of other empires. 15 Correlates of War Project. Territorial Change Dataset, Version 3.0. Online: http:// correlatesofwar.org. See Tir et al. (1998) . 16 Data on annexed area also come from the COW database (see Table A2 ). Table 2 (column 1). Strikingly, the estimate of the British_col i/j dummy is no longer significant. Hence, the endogeneity bias seems to account for the majority of the initial 'British effect'.
This result could be affected by a weak instrument problem. If the IV correlates only weakly with the endogenous explanatory variable (British versus French colonisation), then statements of statistical significance may be misleading. However, the first stage F-statistic on the excluded instrument is about 551, which is fairly above the recommended threshold of The point of our IV strategy, based on historical evidence, is that the threat of foreign expansion led Britain to accept formal annexation of territories where they had trade interest. So, according to the terminology of Angrist et al. (1996) , we work with 'compliers' , 17 that is, territories where the British had trade interests and that they colonised only when the pressure of the foreign expansion was strong enough. We can reasonably rule out the possibility of 'never-takers', that is, territories where the British had trade interests and that they did not colonised despite foreign expansion. Historical evidence suggests also that, in Africa, 'always-takers', that is, territories where the British had trade interests and that they colonised whatever the foreign expansion, are quite rare. Nevertheless, to check the robustness of our IV strategy and limit the potential case of 'always-takers', we drop the very first British colonies from the sample (i.e., Lesotho in 1868, Egypt in 1882, Botswana and South Africa in 1885). These territories may have been the ones where there was minimal expansion by the other colonial power at the time of their colonisation. This robustness check does not change the overall picture. In the first stage, our instrument appears to give an even better prediction of the British versus French colonisation (see bottom rows of column (2)). The F-statistic is even higher. The secondstage estimates, reported at the top of column (2), are qualitatively similar. Again, we do not find any evidence of a 'British effect' . Therefore, the British colonisation does not appear to be the cause of the better trade performance of their former African colonies. This apparent better trade performance could be instead explained by pre-colonial trade patterns. Indeed, our British dummy may capture both a colonisation as well as a pre-colonisation effect. Since the instrument is related to the British colonisation, the IV strategy is only informative about the 'colonisation treatment' effect. Given that the IV estimate is not significant, the positive OLS 'British effect' may be due to the pre-colonisation effect.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine with certainty the exact origin of the favourable pre-colonial conditions in future British colonies. One reason is that there are no comprehensive data on initial preconditions. But one possible interpretation relates to the influence of traders in British colonisation. As noted above, we have found historical evidence that the traders largely demarcated the future British Empire. They may have settled in places where they saw future profits. Indeed, it seems that even before colonisation, the future British colonies were richer, more densely populated and offered better economic opportunities than their French counterparts (d'Almeida Topor, 2003) . 18 At the time of the Scramble, 'though France gained an enormous West African empire and one more than three times as large as Britain's, the major plums in terms of trade and population were denied to her ' (Fage, 2002, p. 352) . Another possible interpretation relates to the British influence. Before formal colonisation, Britain may have implemented institutions favouring trade and a pro-free trade attitude in its future colonised areas. This pro-free trade attitude could have resulted in larger trade flows between future colonies and Britain, as well as with other countries.
Concluding remarks
From the mid-1870s onwards, the 'Scramble for Africa' gave Britain and France virtually the entire African continent. We use this historical evidence to evaluate the impact of the British and French colonial legacies on the current trade performance of former colonies. This research relates to a growing literature linking Africa's current under-development to colonial legacies. Numerous papers have focused on the effect of the colonial legacy on economic growth and development. However, its effect on trade has scarcely been studied. It is unclear whether a country's prior colonial status matters per se. Do the different legacies associated with the British and French colonial powers matter? If so, it could be advisable to adapt institutions in one particular direction.
Using a theoretically founded gravity model of trade, we initially find that former British colonies trade more, on average, than do their French counterparts. This result is in line with the literature emphasising the relative superiority of British institutions and could lead to the conclusion that the institutional environment left by the British is more conducive to trade.
18 Population density is a broad indicator for economic prosperity since only relatively prosperous areas could support dense populations (Acemoglu et al., 2002) . Using data from McEvedy and Jones (1978) , we computed the simple mean of population density. In 1900, population density is 10.52 persons per km 2 for British colonies and 6.88 for French colonies. In 1800, though we have many missing data, we obtain nearly the same difference between the two groups (3.53 for future British colonies and 2.74 for their French counterparts). However, a core concern is the endogenous selection of colonies by the British. The current trade performance of former British colonies could be explained by their pre-colonial trade patterns. Indeed, historical evidence suggests that 'with Britain trade preceded the flag, or directed where the flag should be flown' (Crowder, 1968, p. 70) . After controlling for the nonrandom selection of the former British colonies, we find no evidence of a systematic difference between British and French colonial legacies.
Therefore, our results suggest that the Bristish colonisation does not appear to be the cause of the better trade performance of their former African colonies. As emphasised by Acemoglu et al. (2001 Acemoglu et al. ( , p. 1388 , 'researchers are [probably] overestimating how "bad" French institutions are'. However, note that all IV strategies rest on several assumptions that may limit their validity. A key assumption is that the instrument should not be correlated with the unobservables in the trade specification. We argue that our instrument, the area colonised by the French Empire in Africa at the time of colonisation of a given territory, is exogenous, i.e., not correlated with the current trade of former British colonies. However, this assumption is essentially untestable. Furthermore, the econometric approach consists in estimating the average effect for a specific subpopulation (the 'compliers'). This average effect may not apply in other times and places. However, even if our strategy identifies a local average treatment effect, i.e. relevant only for 'compliers', it is interesting because it produces 'internally' valid estimates of the causal effect of British versus French colonisation in Africa. 19 We argue that the apparent better trade performance of former British colonies in Africa could be instead explained by pre-colonial trade patterns. It is impossible to determine with certainty the exact origin of these favourable pre-colonial conditions. However, some historical comparisons suggest that, even before colonisation, the future British colonies were richer, more densely populated and offered better economic opportunities than their French counterparts. Moreover, before formal colonisation, Britain could have implemented institutions favouring trade and a pro-free trade attitude in its future colonised areas. Total area (in square kilometres) annexed by the other coloniser (France for British colonies or Great Britain for French ones) before the date of first annexation (see Table A1 ). Data on area and date of annexation come from the COW database (Territorial Change Dataset, Version 3.0. Online: http://correlatesofwar.org. See Tir et al., 1998) . The date of a treaty is used as the date of annexation. If no treaty was involved in the territorial change, then this date corresponds to the date (a) when action to take the territorial ceased, (b) a plebiscite occurred or (c) an act of annexation took place 
